Real-life zombies feed off weak passwords.
Regular readers will remember that late last year we saw a peculiar form of distributed bruteforce attack on certain ssh servers. What made this particular batch of failed login attempts stand out was that unlike the traditional rapid-fire bruteforce attempts we were quite adept at heading off with state tracking tricks (such as the OpenBSD PF method described here or a slightly different Linux-specific method), the technique seemed to be specifically designed to slip past such defenses.
I described the method and the evidence at some length in a series of colums, A low intensity, distributed bruteforce attempt (December 2, 2008), A Small Update About The Slow Brutes (December 6, 2008), Into a new year, slowly pounding the gates (December 21, 2008) and finally The slow brutes, a final roundup (January 22, 2009).
If you do not want to read through all of that, I'll recap: The traditional bruteforce attack is characterized by somebody trying again and again to find a combination of logon credentials (typically sets of user names and passwords) that will let them gain access to the system. The basic idea is that given enough tries, you will sooner or later find a user who has set a guessable password, and you have access.
One of the important weaknesses of the method is that the typical attacker would have gained access to only one or a few systems, and the attacker would then typically try to connect a lot more often than a typical user, and sysadmins learned to adapt their firewalls and other systems to lock out activity that fit the bruteforcer profile.
If you run a ssh service anywhere Internet-facing, you will be used to seeing a steady stream of failed logons for both existing and non-existing users. There's nothing new in seeing failed logons in your log files. However, what happened late last year was that we started seeing large numbers of failed ssh logon attempts, with the new twist that the same user would be trying to log on a large number of times, but never from the same place twice in rapid succession. This log data sample will give you an idea. The data will show you the pattern, as will the summary article.
Back then in January, my conclusion was that we had seen the conclusion of a largely failed experiment. After all, proceeding at a truly glacial pace and decreasing the number of attempts per user name as they went along hardly seemed like a recipe for success even if they could sneak past packet filtering based defenses.
It turns out I was wrong. Returning to my log summaries after taking a few days off from log data (yes, easter is big here, even moves geeks sometimes to take time off) I find data with almost exactly the same profile as last December's series.
This can only mean that there were enough successful attempts at guessing people's weak passwords in the last round that our unknown perpetrators found it worthwhile to start another round. For all I know they may have been at it all along, probing other parts of the Internet far from my unfashionable backwaters.
Anyway, they are most certainly back. A summary of the data so far follows in the concluding section. Please note that I would be very interested in communicating with other parties who see similar activity in their logs, and if you are responsible for one or more of the systems identified or you know who is, I urge you to take appropriate action.
The Data So Far
First, We Take root
The full log data reveal that they started rubbing up against my listening posts during the early hours of April 7th 2009 (as measured in CEST), concentrating first on the user root (attempts sorted by hostname here, hostnames here. Not terribly surprising that they tried to take on this one, as most Unix(ish) systems tend to at least have a root account.
Then We Take admin
After about twenty-four hours, the zombies in the cloud tired of root and turned their collective attention to admin (attempts sorted by hostname here, hostnames here. This is a user name I would not expect to be on a Unix syste by default. In my limited experience Microsoft systems tend to use this one more often, but then there may be enough of those systems out there with a SSH service and weak passwords out there to try.
And james Will Make Us Famous
Well into civilized lunchtime (CEST) on April 9th, our would-be guests turned their attention to james (attempts sorted by hostname here, hostnames here. Why this user name received so much attention is a complete mystery to me. They did tire in the end, though.
Before We Turn To 123456, aadi And The Rest Of The Rabble
As if to confirm that we are indeed seeing a rerun of last November and December's sequence of events, the robots started on their regular alphabetic attempts on April 11th:
Apr 11 17:44:15 rosalita sshd: error: PAM: authentication error for illegal user james from 184.108.40.206
Apr 11 17:50:47 rosalita sshd: error: PAM: authentication error for illegal user 123456 from 220.127.116.11
Apr 11 17:53:24 rosalita sshd: error: PAM: authentication error for illegal user 123456 from webmail.sistemafieg.org.br
Apr 11 17:58:25 rosalita sshd: error: PAM: authentication error for illegal user 123456 from 18.104.22.168
Apr 11 18:00:59 rosalita sshd: error: PAM: authentication error for illegal user aadi from mail.cgconsultoriacontabil.com.br
The various comments to my earlier columns tended to point out the near-futility of low-intensity bruteforcing, and I took the fact that the last series of attempts did not run to the end of the alphabet as an indication that the perpetrators themselves had reached the same conclusion.
Now we know that they just moved on, went elsewhere for a while and now they're back. In the meantime, they must have hit on enough weak minds and associated weak passwords that they were able to take over and zombiefy enough systems to be worth their while.
The data so far (collected up to April 12, 2009, roughly 21:00 CEST) indicates that the total number of hosts involved in the attempts at my listening posts is just over a thousand (a list of hosts available here).
It is probably worth repeating that in real life, zombies feed on both weak minds and weak passwords.
If you found this article useful, enjoyable or irritating, please drop me a line. Material related to this article is available for free via links from my web space. Some additional material will be made available for reasonable research purposes. If you want more extensive assistance, please contact me (via email or other means) to make arrangements.
Also worth noting, I will be doing a PF tutorial at BSDCan 2009 in May, and I will be staying around for the rest of the conference. I look forward to seeing you there.
Note: A Better Data Source Is Available
Update 2015-04-02: For a faster and more convenient way to download the data referenced here, please see my BSDCan 2013 presentation The Hail Mary Cloud And The Lessons Learned which summarizes this series of articles and provides links to all the data. The links in the presentation point to a copy stored at NUUG's server, which connects to the world through a significantly fatter pipe than BSDly.net has.